Theoretical Roles for Universals

José Tomás Alvarado

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-53393-9_2

Theoretical Roles for Universals

José Tomás Alvarado^*

^*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Capítulo del libro/informe/acta de congreso › Capítulo › revisión exhaustiva

Resumen

Universals have been traditionally postulated because they can satisfy certain theoretical functions. Universals supposedly explain why different objects have the ‘same’ nature (the one over many problem), why the same object has different natures (the many over one problem), why different objects are objectively similar, why objects have the causal powers they have, what are natural laws, and why our epistemic practices of induction seem reliable. This chapter presents these theoretical roles for universals. Of course, those who reject universals argue that other entities can satisfy the same functions. If those alternatives are acceptable, though, depends on their aptitude to play the explanatory role of universals.

Idioma original	Inglés
Título de la publicación alojada	Synthese Library
Editorial	Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Páginas	23-43
Número de páginas	21
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53393-9_2
Estado	Publicada - 2020
Publicado de forma externa	Sí

Serie de la publicación

Nombre	Synthese Library
Volumen	428
ISSN (versión impresa)	0166-6991
ISSN (versión digital)	2542-8292

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Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

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10.1007/978-3-030-53393-9_2

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Theoretical Roles for Universals

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