The Absence of Need in Husserl as an Explanatory Concept of the Phenomenon of Value: A Proposal from Carl Menger and Ludwig Feuerbach

This paper explores some of the problems raised by the Husserlian explanatory model of affective acts in relation to the phenomenon of value. It is divided into two main parts. In the first, Husserl's theory of value is analyzed from the perspective of its foundational acts, paying special attention to the problem of the relation between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. This section concludes that the intentional schema with which Husserl analyzes affective acts presents problems that derive from his "visual" interpretation. In the second part, the converging ideas of Carl Menger and Ludwig Feuerbach on value theory and action are presented, based on which it is proposed that the missing element in the Husserlian schema is the concept of need. With this concept, an extended intentional scheme of affective acts is developed, featuring a double intentionality of consciousness directed to both the subject and the object.