Resumen
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith proposes an ethics based on feelings. This seems to suggest a moral relativism, since feelings, being relative to each subject, do not have cross-cultural validity. Although some commentators on Smith support this reading of his ethics, this article suggests delving into the elements that allow us to move this theory away from said position. Indeed, based on our equal psychological nature, Smith proposes a common formal structure of judgment that gives rise to universally binding material norms.
| Título traducido de la contribución | Moral Relativism in Adam Smith? |
|---|---|
| Idioma original | Español |
| Páginas (desde-hasta) | 45-69 |
| Número de páginas | 25 |
| Publicación | Open Insight |
| Volumen | 14 |
| N.º | 32 |
| DOI | |
| Estado | Publicada - 2023 |
Nota bibliográfica
Publisher Copyright:© 2023 Centro de Investigacion Social Avanzada. All rights reserved.
Palabras clave
- Impartial spectator
- moral relativism
- sympathy
- Theory of Moral Sentiments
- transculturality
Huella
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