QWERTY is efficient

Bernardo Guimaraes; Ana Elisa Pereira

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

QWERTY is efficient

Bernardo Guimaraes^*
, Ana Elisa Pereira

^*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

7 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	819-825
Número de páginas	7
Publicación	Journal of Economic Theory
Volumen	163
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008
Estado	Publicada - 1 may. 2016
Publicado de forma externa	Sí

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc..

Acceder al documento

10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

Otros archivos y enlaces

Enlace a la publicación en Scopus

Citar esto

@article{0f575e92908647b3b778d31948c45554,

title = "QWERTY is efficient",

abstract = "We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.",

keywords = "Coordination, Dynamic games, Networks, Timing frictions",

author = "Bernardo Guimaraes and Pereira, \{Ana Elisa\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Inc..",

year = "2016",

month = may,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008",

language = "English",

volume = "163",

pages = "819--825",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - QWERTY is efficient

AU - Guimaraes, Bernardo

AU - Pereira, Ana Elisa

PY - 2016/5/1

Y1 - 2016/5/1

N2 - We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.

AB - We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.

KW - Coordination

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Networks

KW - Timing frictions

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84962538017

U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84962538017

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 163

SP - 819

EP - 825

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

ER -

QWERTY is efficient

Resumen

Nota bibliográfica

Acceder al documento

Otros archivos y enlaces

Huella

Citar esto