Objections Against Transcendent Universals

Many objections have been directed against Platonic universals. These objections have seemed so grave that many philosophers are simply closed to consider any positive argument in favor of transcendent universals. This chapter considers the most often referred to objections: (i) the problem of causal powers, (ii) the lack of economy of Platonic universals, and (iii) the epistemological problem about how can one access a transcendent realm of universals. According to the ‘Eleatic principle’ everything should modify the causal powers of something. Supposedly, transcendent universals don’t, so they cannot be admitted into existence. It has also been argued that transcendent universals are less economical than immanent universals because an ontology of transcendent universals requires additionally ‘instantiations’ of universals. In the third place, it has been said that transcendent universals are epistemologically transcendent to our cognitive powers. It is argued in this chapter, nevertheless, that none of these objections is compelling. All causal powers depend on universals. Platonic universals are not less economical than Aristotelian universals, because the introduction of ‘instantiations’, ‘tropes’, ‘modes’ or primitive ‘states of affairs’ is a general requirement for any ontology of universals and particulars. Platonic universals are, finally, not epistemologically transcendent. They are known by their instantiations.