La singular condición de existencia del conocimiento por connaturalidad en la amistad desde el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino

Friendship is a topic extensively discussed by commentators on Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Additionally, although to a lesser extent, the concept of knowledge through affective connaturality is also explored, particularly as it pertains to moral virtue. However, the relationship between these two concepts has not been as thoroughly developed due to some ambiguity regarding the classification of friendship as a virtue. This is because friendship does not function as a disposition that directs a specific faculty toward its proper object, unlike other virtues. Thus, this paper has a dual objective: first, to clarify how friendship should be understood as a virtue within the framework of Thomas Aquinas's thought, which is inherited from Aristotle; and second, to delineate the role of knowledge through connaturality within this context, specifying the conditions necessary for its existence.