¿ESTÁ EL DERECHO PENAL AL MARGEN DE DISCUSIONES AXIOLÓGICAS? A PROPÓSITO DE LA SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL CHILENO SOBRE LA DESPENALIZACIÓN DE LA INTERRUPCIÓN DEL EMBARAZO

This paper makes some comments on the Chilean Constitutional Court's ruling related to the new regulation presented by article 119 of the Health Code. This modification allows the homicide of the unborn beyond sate of necessity. The aim is to show that, in opposition to what the Constitutional Court's prevention indicates, the problem of the new article 119 is in an axiological field. The legal-criminal thesis presented in this article is based on the meta-rule of double effect, which requires a distinction to be made between actions in which the homicide of an innocent person (per se) is sought and those in which death is triggered as a collateral effect (per accident) in situations of state of necessity.