Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents

Bernardo Guimaraes*, Ana Elisa Pereira

*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

4 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We study a dynamic model of coordination with timing frictions and payoff heterogeneity. There is a unique equilibrium, characterized by thresholds that determine the choices of each type of agent. We characterize equilibrium for the limiting cases of vanishing timing frictions and vanishing shocks to fundamentals. A lot of conformity emerges: despite payoff heterogeneity, agents’ equilibrium thresholds partially coincide as long as a set of beliefs that would make this coincidence possible exists. However, the equilibrium thresholds never fully coincide. In case of vanishing frictions, the economy behaves almost as if all agents were equal to an average type. Conformity is not inefficient. In the efficient solution, agents follow others even more often. © 2017 Elsevier B.V.
Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)13-33
Número de páginas21
PublicaciónJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volumen73
DOI
EstadoPublicada - dic. 2017

Nota bibliográfica

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Elsevier B.V.

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