Resumen
Despite the countless similarities between David Hume's and Adam Smith's moral theories, many people have lately argued that the Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a critical response to Hume's ethics. In this paper I contend that the most important difference between these sentimentalist philosophers has to do with the source and nature of morality's normative authority, which in turn determines what is a legitimate moral reason or what is morality properly speaking.
Título traducido de la contribución | David Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the source of normativity in moral sentimentalism |
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Idioma original | Español |
Páginas (desde-hasta) | 341-366 |
Número de páginas | 26 |
Publicación | Topicos (Mexico) |
N.º | 59 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - dic. 2020 |
Publicado de forma externa | Sí |
Nota bibliográfica
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Palabras clave
- Adam Smith
- David Hume
- Moral reasons
- Moral sentimentalism
- Normative authority