Competitive limit of competing auctions

Zizhen Ma; Nicolás Riquelme

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

Competitive limit of competing auctions

Zizhen Ma
, Nicolás Riquelme^*

^*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

Resumen

We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller’s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.

Idioma original	Inglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)	367-382
Número de páginas	16
Publicación	Games and Economic Behavior
Volumen	158
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015
Estado	Publicada - jun. 2026

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© 2026 Elsevier Inc.

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title = "Competitive limit of competing auctions",

abstract = "We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller{\textquoteright}s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.",

keywords = "Competing auctions, Convergence, Finite markets, Large market",

author = "Zizhen Ma and Nicol{\'a}s Riquelme",

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year = "2026",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015",

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AU - Riquelme, Nicolás

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AB - We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller’s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.

KW - Competing auctions

KW - Convergence

KW - Finite markets

KW - Large market

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DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

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SN - 0899-8256

VL - 158

SP - 367

EP - 382

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

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Competitive limit of competing auctions

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