Banking on politics: When former high-ranking politicians become bank directors

Matías Braun, Claudio Raddatz*

*Autor correspondiente de este trabajo

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

33 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

New data are presented for a large number of countries on how frequently former high-ranking politicians become bank directors. Politician-banker connections at this level are relatively rare, but their frequency is robustly correlated with many important characteristics of banks and institutions. At the micro level, banks that are politically connected are larger and more profitable than other banks, despite being less leveraged and having less risk. At the country level, this connectedness is strongly negatively related to economic development. Controlling for this, the analysis finds that the phenomenon is more prevalent where institutions are weaker and governments more powerful but less accountable. Bank regulation tends to be more pro-banker and the banking system less developed where connectedness is higher. A benign, publicinterest view is hard to reconcile with these patterns. Banking sector development, institutions, political economy.

Idioma originalInglés
Número de artículolhq007
Páginas (desde-hasta)234-279
Número de páginas46
PublicaciónWorld Bank Economic Review
Volumen24
N.º2
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 23 jun. 2010
Publicado de forma externa

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