A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado

Producción científica: Contribución a una revista › Artículo › revisión exhaustiva

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Resumen

Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

Idioma original	Inglés
Número de artículo	111784
Publicación	Economics Letters
Volumen	240
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784
Estado	Publicada - jul. 2024

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© 2024 Elsevier B.V.

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10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

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title = "A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation",

abstract = "Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.",

keywords = "Manipulation, Matching markets, Stability",

author = "Sirguiado, \{Camilo J.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2024 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2024",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784",

language = "English",

volume = "240",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Sirguiado, Camilo J.

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AB - Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

KW - Manipulation

KW - Matching markets

KW - Stability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85195275343

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

M3 - Article

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SN - 0165-1765

VL - 240

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 111784

ER -

A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

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