Tolerancia a la diversidad y segregación residencial. Una adaptación del modelo de segregación de Schelling con tres grupos sociales

Translated title of the contribution: Tolerance to diversity and residential segregation. An adaptation of the Schelling segregation model with three social groups

Jorge Urrutia-Mosquera, Héctor López-Ospina, Francisco Sabatini, Alejandra Rasse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Usually, segregation is conceptualized as the consequence of people’s preferences to live close to people similar to them. However, evidence shows something different. While it is true that people want to have neighbors such as themselves, the intensity of this preference -the proportion of similar neighbors they desire to have - varies among individuals and groups. Nonetheless, following Schelling (1971), the aggregated result of people’s interaction in the land market generates levels of segregation higher than individual preferences. This article explores a variation of the Schelling model: While the original model works with two groups, this paper incorporates a third social group, to which it is indifferent to contact with the other two groups. Results show that the presence of this third group generates a decrease of levels of segregation in the city, favoring residential integration.

Translated title of the contributionTolerance to diversity and residential segregation. An adaptation of the Schelling segregation model with three social groups
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)5-24
Number of pages20
JournalEure
Volume43
Issue number130
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2017
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
El trabajo de Schelling ha sido ampliamente revisitado y modificado por diversos autores. Lo han complejizado cambiando las formas de modelación (Young, 1998), introduciendo elementos de competitividad del mercado y valor de las viviendas (Zhang, 2001, 2004; Gravel & Oddou, 2014), costos de relocalización (Bayer & McMillan, 2012), perfiles de preferencias de segregación o integración de los grupos sociales (Pancs & Vriend, 2007; López-Ospina, Cortés & Martínez, 2017; López-Ospina, Martínez & Cortés, 2016), e incorporando la perspectiva de la utilidad global del sistema (Grauwin, Goffette-Nagot & Jensen, 2012). Los hallazgos, además de complementar los resultados de Schelling, confirman lo encontrado en el modelo original: las preferencias de segregación, a nivel agregado, generan patrones de segregación mayores a los individualmente buscados, incluso cuando se asumen individuos con preferencias integradoras; estos patrones de segregación son estables y se mantienen a largo plazo, y tienden a aumentar cuando se toman en cuenta otros factores, como los costos asociados a relocalizarse.

Publisher Copyright:
© EURE.

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