Abstract
Universals have been traditionally postulated because they can satisfy certain theoretical functions. Universals supposedly explain why different objects have the ‘same’ nature (the one over many problem), why the same object has different natures (the many over one problem), why different objects are objectively similar, why objects have the causal powers they have, what are natural laws, and why our epistemic practices of induction seem reliable. This chapter presents these theoretical roles for universals. Of course, those who reject universals argue that other entities can satisfy the same functions. If those alternatives are acceptable, though, depends on their aptitude to play the explanatory role of universals.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Synthese Library |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media B.V. |
| Pages | 23-43 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Publication series
| Name | Synthese Library |
|---|---|
| Volume | 428 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0166-6991 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 2542-8292 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2020, The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.