The Argument for a Final End in Nicomachean Ethics 1. 1-2: A Case for a Normative Reading1

This article proposes a practical-normative reading of Aristotle's argument for a final end in Nicomachean Ethics 1094a18-26. Against the more widespread interpretation that goes back to Aquinas, which takes Aristotle to be proving that a final end necessarily exists as a condition for the possibility of human action or desire, I argue that the argument establishes a practical-normative thesis, namely that it is better for rational agents to organize their lives around a final end wished for its own sake. An important element of my reading lies in understanding "empty and futile" (κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν) not as denoting factual impossibility but as indicating a deficient exercise of practical rationality. On my reading, Anscombe's famous objection' "that Aristotle commits a fallacy in moving from "all chains must stop somewhere" to "there is somewhere where all chains must stop" "can be fended off, as it attacks an argument that Aristotle does not actually advance.