Abstract
The Scottish sentimentalist philosophers David Hume and Adam Smith suggest different strategies for restricting and accommodating human selfish tendencies. In spite of the obvious similarities of their moral proposals, Smith finds within the human being the capacity to transform his partial passions and to aspire to ideals of perfection. In contrast, Hume's sentimentalism does not allow for self-transformation, and must rely on social conventions to manipulate and redirect selfish impulses from without. Both attempts achieve their goal. However, while for Hume peaceful social interaction seems to be the only aim of morality; for Smith morality also opens a new dimension of development for the human being.
Translated title of the contribution | Scottish Sentimentalism: Hume and Smith against moral egoism |
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Original language | Spanish |
Pages (from-to) | 55-74 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Veritas |
Issue number | 39 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
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