This paper deals with Heidegger's critical reception of intensionalistic theory of judgment such as it is developed in his early writings on logic and the lectures related to Being and Time. It is shown that Heidegger's early development can be understood in terms of a consistent attempt to find a middle path between anti-naturalism and anti-formalism. Heidegger's conception in Being and Time, with the resumption of the Seinsfrage, proves to be a positive-critical reaction to the problem situation, which was characteristic for philosophy of the logic in the neokantian and phenomenological thought, as a consequence of the criticism addressed to psychologism.
|Translated title of the contribution||Sense, truth and worth. On Heidegger's critical reception of intensionalistic theory of judgment|
|Number of pages||33|
|Journal||Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie|
|State||Published - Jun 2004|