Abstract
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith proposes an ethics based on feelings. This seems to suggest a moral relativism, since feelings, being relative to each subject, do not have cross-cultural validity. Although some commentators on Smith support this reading of his ethics, this article suggests delving into the elements that allow us to move this theory away from said position. Indeed, based on our equal psychological nature, Smith proposes a common formal structure of judgment that gives rise to universally binding material norms.
| Translated title of the contribution | Moral Relativism in Adam Smith? |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 45-69 |
| Number of pages | 25 |
| Journal | Open Insight |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 32 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
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