QWERTY is efficient

Bernardo Guimaraes*, Ana Elisa Pereira

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)819-825
Number of pages7
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume163
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 May 2016
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier Inc..

Keywords

  • Coordination
  • Dynamic games
  • Networks
  • Timing frictions

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