QWERTY is efficient

Bernardo Guimaraes; Ana Elisa Pereira

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

QWERTY is efficient

Bernardo Guimaraes, Ana Elisa Pereira

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	819-825
Number of pages	7
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	163
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008
State	Published - 1 May 2016
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Coordination
Dynamic games
Networks
Timing frictions

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10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.008

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title = "QWERTY is efficient",

abstract = "We study a dynamic coordination problem with staggered decisions where agents choose between two competing networks. If the intrinsically worst one prevails, this is efficient. Moreover, inefficient shifts to the intrinsically best network might occur in equilibrium.",

keywords = "Coordination, Dynamic games, Networks, Timing frictions, Coordination, Dynamic games, Networks, Timing frictions",

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