Market Power Absent Merger Review: Brewing in Perú

Ariel A. Casarin, Magdalena Cornejo, María Eugenia Delfino

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the extent of market power in the brewing market of Perú, where the absence of preventive merger review eased consolidation into a single industrial brewer. We use a standard oligopoly model and exploit both seasonality in demand and atypically large and frequent variations in the structure and level of excise taxes to identify variations in market power. Our results provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of competition policy as uncontested mergers resulted in a degree of market power that decreased only with the entry of new firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)535-556
Number of pages22
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Volume56
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 May 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Ariel A. Casarin: Financial support from IDRC-Canada Grant 107206-001 is gratefully acknowledged. We thank three anonymous reviewers and in particular the editor for his valuable suggestions and guidance in improving our paper. All errors are ours.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Brewing industry
  • Market power
  • Merger review

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Market Power Absent Merger Review: Brewing in Perú'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this