La ética de adam smith: Conciliando paradigmas, una propuesta olvidada

María Alejandra Carrasco*

*Corresponding author for this work

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In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith reconciles two moral paradigms that are usually considered incompatible: an ethics of virtue, with general guidelines and ideals of excellence, and an ethics with universal rules, which must be applied to all cases without exceptions. Smith makes this possible by shifting the perspective from which moral judgments are assessed to what I call the ‘sympathetic-impartial’ perspective, which stands for "the sympathetic feelings of an impartial and well-informed spectator". From this new standpoint, Smith is able to introduce some modern features into classic virtue ethics and provide a different justification for positive virtues, as well as to change the way ‘universal norms or principles’ are understood. Accordingly, Smith’s theory accounts simultaneously, and within the same theoretical framework, for both ancient-like virtues and their ideals of excellence and for modern-like universal imperatives.

Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)23-38
Number of pages16
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Jul 2016
Externally publishedYes

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