Abstract
The proportional construction of fundamental rights understands them as principles of maximization. No principle has direct legal consequences. The legal consequences that follow from a norm of fundamental rights depend on the other principles with which it may be in conflict. It is a presupposition of this interpretation that the 'interest' or 'value' represented by a norm should be commensurable with any other value. It is argued here that there are very forceful reasons to doubt that there is such a commensuration. Even granting the commensuration between basic values alleged by the defender of the proportional interpretation, there are models in which this commensuration makes no sense. There are no reasons, then, to accept the proportional interpretation.
| Translated title of the contribution | Incommensurability of basic values and proportionalism. Philosophical presuppositions of the proportionalist interpretation of fundamental rights |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 311-334 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Revista Chilena de Derecho |
| Volume | 43 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 2016 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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