Inconmensurabilidad de los valores básicos y proporcionalismo. Presupuestos filosóficos de la interpretación proporcionalista de los derechos fundamentales

Translated title of the contribution: Incommensurability of basic values and proportionalism. Philosophical presuppositions of the proportionalist interpretation of fundamental rights

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Abstract

The proportional construction of fundamental rights understands them as principles of maximization. No principle has direct legal consequences. The legal consequences that follow from a norm of fundamental rights depend on the other principles with which it may be in conflict. It is a presupposition of this interpretation that the 'interest' or 'value' represented by a norm should be commensurable with any other value. It is argued here that there are very forceful reasons to doubt that there is such a commensuration. Even granting the commensuration between basic values alleged by the defender of the proportional interpretation, there are models in which this commensuration makes no sense. There are no reasons, then, to accept the proportional interpretation.

Translated title of the contributionIncommensurability of basic values and proportionalism. Philosophical presuppositions of the proportionalist interpretation of fundamental rights
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)311-334
Number of pages24
JournalRevista Chilena de Derecho
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2016
Externally publishedYes

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