Freedom as a cause. Heidegger, Kant and the ontological problem of freedom

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Abstract

This paper discusses Heidegger's criticism of Kant's conception of freedom as a peculiar kind of cause. With his view of freedom Kant consummates the central tendencies of traditional ontology, ultimately arising from the Greek understanding of Being in terms of "constant presence". But the causal view does not do justice to the deeper roots of freedom in the transcendence of Dasein.

Translated title of the contributionFreedom as a cause. Heidegger, Kant and the ontological problem of freedom
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)161-181
Number of pages21
JournalAnuario Filosofico
Volume43
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes

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