Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation

Felipe Aldunate

doi:10.1111/fima.12201

Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation

Felipe Aldunate^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this article, I examine how changes in the competitive environment of firms affect matches between chief executive officers (CEOs) and firms. I exploit the 1980 Staggers Rail Act, which drastically deregulated the freight railroad industry, as a source of arguably exogenous variation in the operating environment. Using hand-collected data, I obtain three main findings: first, CEO turnover rates increase; second, relative to utility firms, railroad CEOs have more business education and show broader work experience after deregulation; and third, firm performance leads to CEO turnover only during the regulated period.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	451-476
Number of pages	26
Journal	Financial Management
Volume	47
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12201
State	Published - 1 Jun 2018
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Financial Management Association International.

Access to Document

10.1111/fima.12201

Cite this

@article{ef9eec444281441e80f6f599def2aa00,

title = "Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation",

abstract = "In this article, I examine how changes in the competitive environment of firms affect matches between chief executive officers (CEOs) and firms. I exploit the 1980 Staggers Rail Act, which drastically deregulated the freight railroad industry, as a source of arguably exogenous variation in the operating environment. Using hand-collected data, I obtain three main findings: first, CEO turnover rates increase; second, relative to utility firms, railroad CEOs have more business education and show broader work experience after deregulation; and third, firm performance leads to CEO turnover only during the regulated period.",

author = "Felipe Aldunate",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Financial Management Association International.",

year = "2018",

month = jun,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1111/fima.12201",

language = "English",

volume = "47",

pages = "451--476",

journal = "Financial Management",

issn = "0046-3892",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Firm Competition and CEO Turnover

T2 - Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation

AU - Aldunate, Felipe

PY - 2018/6/1

Y1 - 2018/6/1

N2 - In this article, I examine how changes in the competitive environment of firms affect matches between chief executive officers (CEOs) and firms. I exploit the 1980 Staggers Rail Act, which drastically deregulated the freight railroad industry, as a source of arguably exogenous variation in the operating environment. Using hand-collected data, I obtain three main findings: first, CEO turnover rates increase; second, relative to utility firms, railroad CEOs have more business education and show broader work experience after deregulation; and third, firm performance leads to CEO turnover only during the regulated period.

AB - In this article, I examine how changes in the competitive environment of firms affect matches between chief executive officers (CEOs) and firms. I exploit the 1980 Staggers Rail Act, which drastically deregulated the freight railroad industry, as a source of arguably exogenous variation in the operating environment. Using hand-collected data, I obtain three main findings: first, CEO turnover rates increase; second, relative to utility firms, railroad CEOs have more business education and show broader work experience after deregulation; and third, firm performance leads to CEO turnover only during the regulated period.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85048358698&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/fima.12201

DO - 10.1111/fima.12201

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85048358698

SN - 0046-3892

VL - 47

SP - 451

EP - 476

JO - Financial Management

JF - Financial Management

IS - 2

ER -

Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this