Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects

Adriana Gama, Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, Ana Elisa Pereira

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations


This paper investigates the effects of exogenous entry on market performance, and the profitability and welfare effects of horizontal mergers in symmetric Cournot oligopolies with firm-specific network effects. With strategic substitutes in the Cournot part of the model, per-firm output is declining in the number of firms, but industry output, price, per-firm profit, consumer surplus and social welfare may go either way in response to entry. We identify respective sufficient conditions for each possibility. The counter-intuitive conclusions tend to require strong network effects. We study the scope for profitability of mergers and the associated welfare effects. In a general analysis, we provide a sufficient condition on inverse demand for a merger to be profitable, which amounts to requiring strong network effects. Under the condition that leads to higher industry output with entry, mergers are always social welfare-enhancing.
Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1139-1164
Number of pages26
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Nov 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.


  • Demand-side economies of scale
  • Incompatibility
  • Mergers
  • Network effects
  • Network industries


Dive into the research topics of 'Entry and mergers in oligopoly with firm-specific network effects'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this