We present a general framework of dynamic coordination with timing frictions. A continuum of agents receive random chances to choose between two actions and remain locked in the selected action until their next opportunity to reoptimize. The instantaneous utility from each action depends on an exogenous fundamental that moves stochastically and on the mass of agents currently playing each action. Agents' decisions are strategic complements and history matters. We review some key theoretical results and show a general method to solve the social planner's problem. We then review applications of this framework to different economic problems: network externalities, statistical discrimination, and business cycles. The positive implications of these models are very similar, but the social planner's solution points to very different results for efficiency in each case. Last, we review extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates and ex ante heterogeneous agents.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
We thank the editor Rabah Amir, the associate editor, an anonymous referee and the students of courses on Dynamic Coordination at the Sao Paulo School of Economics—FGV for their helpful comments and suggestions. Guimaraes gratefully acknowledges financial support from CNPq. Machado and Pereira gratefully acknowledge financial support from CONICYT through FONDECYT Iniciación grants #11180046 and #11190202, respectively.
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