Abstract
This article examines two conceptions of practical identity, the first represented by Christine Korsgaard, the second developed by Aristotle. On the one hand, it is shown how Korsgaard grounds his conception of practical identity in the reflective capacity of the human being; on the other hand, it is shown that Aristotle projects into the notion of ήθος what could be catalogued with a certain conception of practical identity quite differentiated. Finally, it is argued that both theories, although different in their approach, contribute to a deeper and more complete understanding of human action.
| Translated title of the contribution | Two Conceptions of Practical Identity: Aristotle and Korsgaard |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 287-310 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Azafea |
| Volume | 27 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2025 |
Bibliographical note
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