Abstract
Despite the countless similarities between David Hume's and Adam Smith's moral theories, many people have lately argued that the Theory of Moral Sentiments can be read as a critical response to Hume's ethics. In this paper I contend that the most important difference between these sentimentalist philosophers has to do with the source and nature of morality's normative authority, which in turn determines what is a legitimate moral reason or what is morality properly speaking.
| Translated title of the contribution | David Hume Versus Adam Smith: On the source of normativity in moral sentimentalism |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 341-366 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Topicos (Mexico) |
| Issue number | 59 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2020 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
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