Creer. Una perspectiva socrática

In this essay, I advance an argument for a conception of critical rationality rooted in Socratic-Platonic thought, which begins by acknowledging human fallibility and stresses the importance of committing to cooperation and dialogue. I refer to this as ‘fallibilism without epistemic resignation’. Ultimately, this stance must be grounded in a general attitude of trust in rationality itself. I begin by discussing the notion of belief, drawing attention to two key distinctions: first, between ‘believing in’ and ‘believing that’, and second, between ‘conscious belief’ and ‘non-conscious belief’. Building on these distinctions, I explore how belief is integrated within the framework of the critical conception of rationality developed by Socrates and Plato. Finally, I draw some conclusions, with particular emphasis on the essential role played by both a shared commitment to truth and a general trust in rationality, as these elements provide a vital foundation for endorsing dialogue and fostering epistemic cooperation.