Abstract
The possibility of false pleasures is no doubt one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary literature on Plato's Philebus. In this context, the crucial debate and a wide number of interpretations relate to those remarks specifically concerning the falsehood of pleasures of expectation (36c-41b). The available interpretative options vary depending on whether they conceive falsehood of expectations in terms of an "ontological", "epistemological", or a "moral" criterion of truth. This essay aims to show that, instead of resting on a single criterion, a correct understanding of pleasures of expectation should take into account the mutual interaction between all these different criteria: while ontological truth determines the content of expectations, epistemological truth (that is, the correction of the relevant belief state) and moral truth (that is, the goodness of the affective-dispositional state) jointly define the specific type of such pleasures. To model an explanation of this notion of truth, I shall borrow from Aristotle's account of "practical truth".
| Translated title of the contribution | Belief, affective state and truth: Pleasures of expectation in Plato's Philebus |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 395-418 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2016 |
Bibliographical note
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