Competitive limit of competing auctions

Zizhen Ma; Nicolás Riquelme

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

Competitive limit of competing auctions

Zizhen Ma
, Nicolás Riquelme^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller’s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	367-382
Number of pages	16
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	158
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015
State	Published - Jun 2026

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

Competing auctions
Convergence
Finite markets
Large market

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

Cite this

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title = "Competitive limit of competing auctions",

abstract = "We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller{\textquoteright}s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.",

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author = "Zizhen Ma and Nicol{\'a}s Riquelme",

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year = "2026",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015",

language = "English",

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AU - Riquelme, Nicolás

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AB - We study the link between strategic equilibria of competing auctions and the “competitive distribution of auctions” (Peters, 1997). With minimal restrictions on each seller’s possible costs and feasible reserve prices, we show that as the number of players increases to infinity while fixing a positive buyer-to-seller ratio, symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria of finite markets converge to the competitive equilibrium of the large market.

KW - Competing auctions

KW - Convergence

KW - Finite markets

KW - Large market

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105035230512

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2026.03.015

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:105035230512

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 158

SP - 367

EP - 382

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Competitive limit of competing auctions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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