The possibility of false pleasures is no doubt one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary literature on Plato's Philebus. In this context, the crucial debate and a wide number of interpretations relate to those remarks specifically concerning the falsehood of pleasures of expectation (36c-41b). The available interpretative options vary depending on whether they conceive falsehood of expectations in terms of an "ontological", "epistemological", or a "moral" criterion of truth. This essay aims to show that, instead of resting on a single criterion, a correct understanding of pleasures of expectation should take into account the mutual interaction between all these different criteria: while ontological truth determines the content of expectations, epistemological truth (that is, the correction of the relevant belief state) and moral truth (that is, the goodness of the affective-dispositional state) jointly define the specific type of such pleasures. To model an explanation of this notion of truth, I shall borrow from Aristotle's account of "practical truth".
|Translated title of the contribution||Belief, affective state and truth: Pleasures of expectation in Plato's Philebus|
|Number of pages||24|
|Journal||Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofia|
|State||Published - 2016|
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