Abstract
In this paper I will argue that Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments is not a relativistic ethics. Although many ethical norms are conventional, there are others, particularly those of justice, which are cross-cultural. Smith's view of justice, summarized in the imperative 'Do not harm our equals', contains two elements: on the one hand the term 'harm', which might be culture-relative; yet, on the other, the term 'equals', whose referent, although not always recognized, does not depend on different 'cultures' notions.
| Translated title of the contribution | Adam Smith and relativism |
|---|---|
| Original language | Spanish |
| Pages (from-to) | 179-204 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| Journal | Anuario Filosofico |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| State | Published - 2009 |
| Externally published | Yes |