Abstract
This paper proposes that the particular moral point of view embodied in Adam Smith’s ethics, which ultimately follows a model based on the determination of justice, enables him to introduce impartiality as a measure for every virtue, and to posit the equal dignity of all human beings as the justification of his ethics. This moral viewpoint, which I here call the ‘sympathetic-impartial perspective’, is naturally learned by human beings in the course of socialization through the ongoing interaction between the innate impulse to sympathize and practically-informed reason. Moreover, this particular perspective creates a bridge between Smith’s moral and political theories, shedding new light upon the moral foundations of his ‘system of natural liberty’.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 135-156 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Journal of Scottish Philosophy |
Volume | 6 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2008 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2008, Edinburgh University Press. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- ethics
- impartial spectator
- moral sentiments
- Smith
- sympathy