ADAM SMITH ON MORALITY, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY

Maria A. Carrasco*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper proposes that the particular moral point of view embodied in Adam Smith’s ethics, which ultimately follows a model based on the determination of justice, enables him to introduce impartiality as a measure for every virtue, and to posit the equal dignity of all human beings as the justification of his ethics. This moral viewpoint, which I here call the ‘sympathetic-impartial perspective’, is naturally learned by human beings in the course of socialization through the ongoing interaction between the innate impulse to sympathize and practically-informed reason. Moreover, this particular perspective creates a bridge between Smith’s moral and political theories, shedding new light upon the moral foundations of his ‘system of natural liberty’.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)135-156
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Scottish Philosophy
Volume6
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2008
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2008, Edinburgh University Press. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • ethics
  • impartial spectator
  • moral sentiments
  • Smith
  • sympathy

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