Acoger la excepción. La prudencia del juez como punto de conexión entre las ideas schmittianas y aristotélicas

Joaquín García-Huidobro; Diego Pérez Lasserre

doi:10.6018/DAIMON.373451

Acoger la excepción. La prudencia del juez como punto de conexión entre las ideas schmittianas y aristotélicas

Translated title of the contribution: Embrace the exception. The prudence of the judge as a point of connection between Schmittian and Aristotelic ideas

Joaquín García-Huidobro, Diego Pérez Lasserre

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This work aims to justify that, although it is true that there are differences between Aristotelian and Schmittian philosophy, there is a point of connection between both in what refers to prudence. In particular, we intend to demonstrate that in Schmitt’s description of the role of the judge in Law and Judgment (1912) and On the three types of juristic thought (1934) ideas of the practical philosophy of the Stagirite are present.

Translated title of the contribution	Embrace the exception. The prudence of the judge as a point of connection between Schmittian and Aristotelic ideas
Original language	Spanish
Pages (from-to)	185-199
Number of pages	15
Journal	Daimon
Issue number	83
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.6018/DAIMON.373451
State	Published - 1 May 2021

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© 2021 Universidad de Murcia Servicio de Publicaciones. All rights reserved.

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Acoger la excepción. La prudencia del juez como punto de conexión entre las ideas schmittianas y aristotélicas

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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