A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Camilo J. Sirguiado

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

Original language	English
Article number	111784
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	240
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784
State	Published - Jul 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Manipulation
Matching markets
Stability

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10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

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title = "A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation",

abstract = "Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.",

keywords = "Manipulation, Matching markets, Stability",

author = "Sirguiado, \{Camilo J.\}",

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year = "2024",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784",

language = "English",

volume = "240",

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AU - Sirguiado, Camilo J.

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AB - Stability and reducing opportunities for strategic behavior are common goals in matching markets. In scenarios where agents can report a restricted number of potential partners as acceptable, we characterize the family of stable mechanisms that minimize the number of manipulative agents in each preference profile.

KW - Manipulation

KW - Matching markets

KW - Stability

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85195275343

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111784

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85195275343

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 240

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

M1 - 111784

ER -

A characterization of stable mechanisms that minimize manipulation

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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